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The precedential force of decisions by a federal circuit court of 
appeals might strike the typical practitioner as a settled issue. It is 
axiomatic, for example, that a federal circuit court of appeals’ decision 
on questions of federal law binds subsequent panels of that court and 
district courts within that circuit, absent intervening contrary authority in 
the form of a federal statute, a decision from the court of appeal sitting 
en banc, or the Supreme Court of the United States. One might anticipate 
that a federal circuit court of appeals’ “prediction” of state law in a 
diversity jurisdiction case pursuant to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,1 
would have similar force, but is this true? 
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 1 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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And what about cross-jurisdictional applications of federal court of 
appeals decisions in state courts? State courts certainly do not consider 
themselves bound by a federal court of appeals’ Erie predictions.2 But do 
they feel similarly about a federal court of appeals’ decisions on 
questions of federal law? For example, where the United States Supreme 
Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have not spoken on a Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure question, does the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court consider itself bound by a Third Circuit decision addressing that 
question? 
Needless to say, how a particular court treats federal court of 
appeals’ precedent can often be critical in litigation. For example, 
counsel handling a case in Mississippi state court implicating a question 
of federal law should be well aware that a Fifth Circuit decision on that 
question will control the Mississippi court.3 And counsel preparing an 
appeal of a state law question before the Fifth Circuit should be 
cognizant of that court’s strong deference to its own precedent on the 
question, whether or not the relevant state’s intermediate appellate court 
has weighed in on it.4 
This Article will provide a thorough examination of the state of the 
law on each of these important questions of federal court of appeals’ 
precedent, and offer some analysis on the correctness of the various 
approaches taken to these questions. 
I. FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS’ ERIE PREDICTIONS 
A. Erie and the Supreme Court’s Teachings on How to Make Erie 
Predictions 
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court overruled its 
decision in Swift v. Tyson5 and held that in cases where state law 
provides the rule of decision, federal courts have a constitutionally-
rooted obligation to ascertain and apply “the law of the state.”6 The Court 
declared that “whether the law of the State shall be declared by its 
                                                                                                             
 2 See, e.g., Cambria-Stoltz Enters. v. TNT Invs., 747 A.2d 947, 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000) (Third Circuit’s interpretation of state law not binding on Pennsylvania state 
courts) (citation omitted). 
 3 See King v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc., 697 So. 2d 439, 440 (Miss. 1997) (“This 
Court’s task in the present case is simplified greatly by the fact that there is a Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision on point, which this Court considers to be controlling 
with regard to the present issue of federal law.”). 
 4 FDIC v. Abraham, 137 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 5 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 6 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
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Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter 
of federal concern[,]”7 implying at least that federal courts must look to a 
state’s highest court in ascertaining state law.8 Only a few years later, the 
Court stated clearly that “the duty rests upon federal courts to apply state 
law under the Rules of Decision statute in accordance with the then 
controlling decision of the highest state court.”9 
If a state’s highest court has not addressed an issue of state law, but 
its intermediate appellate court has, how should a federal court in Erie 
mode assess that intermediate appellate court decision? The Supreme 
Court first addressed this question in a quartet of cases decided shortly 
after Erie.10 In West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., the Court 
explained that a “rule of law” announced by an intermediate appellate 
                                                                                                             
 7 Id. 
 8 See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 696 
(1995) (noting that, combined with the Court’s pre-Erie deference to the highest state 
court’s interpretation of a state statute, this statement from Erie “implies that federal 
courts will find all state law in pronouncements of the state’s highest court.”). 
 9 Vandenbark v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941). It should be noted, 
however, that this rule is not ironclad. In Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, decided only 
a few years after Vandenbark, the Supreme Court stated that “the rulings of the Supreme 
Court of Florida . . . must be taken as controlling . . . unless it can be said with some 
assurance that the Florida Supreme Court will not follow them in the future.”  320 U.S. 
228, 234 (1943) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic 
Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956) (following old Vermont Supreme Court decision, 
but only after finding “no confusion in the Vermont decisions, no developing line of 
authorities that casts a shadow over the established ones, no dicta, doubts or ambiguities 
in the opinions of Vermont judges on the question, no legislative development that 
promises to undermine the judicial rule.”). 
  Often relying expressly on Meredith and Bernhardt, numerous federal courts 
rendering Erie predictions have deemed themselves free to depart from a decision of the 
state’s highest court in predicting how that court would rule. See, e.g., AIG Centennial 
Ins. Co. v. Fraley-Landers, 450 F.3d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that “[w]e are not 
required to apply all decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court [on matters of Arkansas 
law], even if they have not been expressly overruled, if we are convinced that that court 
would not follow them[,]” and refusing to follow a 1960 Arkansas Supreme Court 
decision in ascertaining Arkansas law) (citation omitted); Swix v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 373 
F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Where a state’s highest court has spoken to an issue, we 
are bound by that decision unless we are convinced that the high court would overrule it 
if confronted with facts similar to those before us.”) (citing Bernhardt); MindGames, Inc. 
v. W. Publ’g Co., Inc., 218 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that “there will be 
occasional, though rare, instances in which the best prediction of what the state’s highest 
court will do is that it will not follow its previous decision[,]” and refusing to follow a 
1924 Arkansas Supreme Court decision in ascertaining Arkansas law) (emphasis added); 
In re Ryan, 851 F.2d 502, 509 n.9 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that Bernhardt “indicated that 
on certain occasions a federal court need not follow an old state supreme court 
decision.”). 
 10 West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 
311 U.S. 169 (1940); Six Cos. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 (1940); 
Stoner v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940).  
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state court “is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is 
convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state 
would decide otherwise.”11 As discussed in the sections that follow, the 
rule of West sets the stage for conflict and uncertainty in assessing the 
precedential weight of a federal court of appeals’ Erie prediction where 
the relevant state intermediate appellate court has decided the state law 
question differently. 
B. Federal Courts of Appeals’ Contrasting Approaches to Assessing the 
Precedential Force of Their Own Erie Predictions 
The Supreme Court of the United States has thus made clear that 
while decisions from a state’s intermediate appellate court do not bind a 
federal court rendering an Erie prediction, they must be considered, if 
not followed, unless the federal court is “convinced” by “persuasive 
data” that the intermediate appellate court decision would not be 
followed by the state’s highest court. But the Supreme Court has not 
addressed how a federal court of appeals should treat such an 
intermediate appellate court decision when that decision conflicts with 
the court of appeals’ own, previous decision. This creates an obvious 
possibility of conflict, for it is well-settled that federal courts of appeals 
follow their own, prior precedent unless that precedent has been 
abrogated by (a) federal statute, (b) a decision of the federal court of 
appeals sitting en banc, (c) a decision of the United States Supreme 
Court, or generally, in the case of an issue of state law, (d) a decision of 
the relevant state’s highest court.12 Assuming none of these abrogating 
events has transpired, how should a federal court of appeals treat its own 
prior Erie prediction where that prediction has been rejected, criticized or 
otherwise undermined by an intervening decision of the relevant state’s 
intermediate appellate court? Should it blindly follow its own precedent, 
pursuant to stare decisis? If not, under what circumstances can or should 
it adopt the view of the state intermediate appellate court as the 
appropriate Erie prediction of state law? 
There appears to be disagreement among the circuits as to the 
precedential weight afforded to a federal court of appeals’ prior Erie 
                                                                                                             
 11 West, 311 U.S. at 237. See also Stoner, 311 U.S. at 467 (“[F]ederal courts, under 
the doctrine of Erie . . . must follow the decisions of intermediate state courts in the 
absence of convincing evidence that the highest court of the state would decide 
differently.”). 
 12 Although, as discussed above, the circuits have generally recognized their freedom 
to depart from a decision of the relevant state’s highest court where there is good reason 
to believe that court would not follow that decision. See supra note 8. 
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prediction.13 There is language from decisions in a number of circuits 
that suggests those circuits will follow their own Erie prediction 
precedent despite a contrary, intervening decision from a state 
intermediate appellate court. In Wankier v. Crown Equipment Corp.,14 
for example, the Tenth Circuit, in a decision requiring the prediction of 
Utah law, explained that when a court of appeals must perform its 
“ventriloquial function” under Erie of predicting how the state’s highest 
court would rule, it “is bound by ordinary principles of stare decisis.”15 
“Thus,” the court concluded, “when a panel of this Court has rendered a 
decision interpreting state law, that interpretation is binding on district 
courts in this circuit, and on subsequent panels of this Court, unless an 
intervening decision of the state’s highest court has resolved the issue.”16 
As such, Wankier can be read to preclude subsequent panels of the Tenth 
Circuit from ignoring a prior panel’s Erie prediction even where state 
intermediate appellate courts have rejected that prior prediction, though 
the court in Wankier did not confront that scenario.17 
The Eleventh Circuit appears to have moved recently toward a 
more robust stare decisis approach to assessing its own state law 
predictions. In Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos.,18 the 
court stated in dicta in a footnote that it was bound by its prior panel’s 
decision on the relevant issue of Georgia law, notwithstanding an 
intervening decision from Georgia’s intermediate appellate court to the 
contrary, “unless and until [the prior panel’s decision] is overruled by 
intervening, on-point case law from our circuit sitting en banc, the 
Supreme Court, or, on matters of Georgia state law, the Georgia Supreme 
Court.”19 
                                                                                                             
 13 See Jed I. Bergman, Note, Putting Precedent in Its Place: Stare Decisis and 
Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 970 (1996) (noting that the 
“rules governing the binding force of predictive precedents in the federal courts . . . [are] 
confused and inconsistent.”). 
 14 353 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 15 Id. at 866. 
 16 Id. (citations omitted). 
 17 However, it should be noted that it is not at all clear that this reading of Wankier 
accurately depicts the Tenth Circuit’s approach to dealing with prior panel precedent that 
conflicts with an intervening state intermediate appellate court decision. See, e.g., 
Perlmutter v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 54 F.3d 659, 662 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[A]lthough we are 
not obligated to follow the pronouncements of lower state courts, ‘in the absence of any 
compelling reason to disregard them,’ we follow decisions of the Colorado Court of 
Appeals as well.”). However, Perlmutter did not involve a choice between prior panel 
precedent and a state intermediate appellate court decision. 
 18 404 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 19 Id. at 1307 n.15 (citing United States v. Chubbuck, 252 F.3d 1300, 1305 n.7 (11th 
Cir. 2001)). 
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Other circuits apparently are more willing to depart from their Erie 
predictions where there is a contrary decision from the relevant state 
intermediate appellate court, though these circuits apply a range of 
standards. While it acknowledges that it can and will follow state 
intermediate appellate court decisions over its own Erie predictions in 
some instances, the Fifth Circuit appears to follow a strong presumption 
in favor of following its own Erie predictions. In FDIC v. Abraham,20 the 
Fifth Circuit explained: 
We are, of course, a strict stare decisis court. One aspect of 
that doctrine to which we adhere without exception is the rule 
that one panel of this court cannot disregard, much less overrule, 
the decision of a prior panel. Adherence to this rule is no less 
immutable when the matter determined by the prior panel is the 
interpretation of state law: Such interpretations are no less 
binding on subsequent panels than are prior interpretations of 
federal law. . . . 
We conclude then, that when our Erie analysis of controlling 
state law is conducted for the purpose of deciding whether to 
follow or depart from prior precedent of this circuit, and neither a 
clearly contrary subsequent holding of the highest court of the 
state nor a subsequent statutory authority, squarely on point, is 
available for guidance, we should not disregard our own prior 
precedent on the basis of subsequent intermediate state appellate 
court precedent unless such precedent comprises unanimous or 
near-unanimous holdings from several— preferably a majority—
of the intermediate appellate courts of the state in question.21 
The Ninth Circuit appears to take an approach opposite to the Fifth 
Circuit’s approach. In In re Watts,22 the Ninth Circuit concluded that it 
would follow an intervening, state intermediate appellate court decision 
“unless there is convincing evidence that the highest court of the state 
would decide differently.”23 Thus, rather than applying a presumption in 
favor of following its own view of state law, as enunciated by the Fifth 
Circuit in Abraham, the Ninth Circuit appears to apply a presumption 
against following its view of state law in favor of that articulated by a 
state intermediate appellate court. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth 
Circuit also appears to be more willing than the Fifth to follow an 
                                                                                                             
 20 137 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 21 Id. at 268-69 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 22 298 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 23 Id. at 1083 (quoting Owen ex rel. Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461, 1464 (9th 
Cir. 1983)). 
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intervening decision from a state intermediate appellate court, finding 
that a mere “indication” from a state intermediate appellate court that the 
federal court of appeals’ prior Erie prediction was incorrect would be 
sufficient to support the court of appeals’ departure from its own 
precedent.24 The Fourth Circuit appears to be in general accord with this 
approach.25 
The Seventh Circuit does not consider itself bound by its own, prior 
Erie predictions, but it has not settled on a definitive approach to 
balancing those predictions with intervening decisions from a state 
intermediate appellate court. In Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Casualty 
Co.,26 the court refused to follow Green v. J.C. Penney Auto Insurance 
Co.,27 its own then-eighteen-year-old Erie prediction, where the Illinois 
intermediate appellate court had unanimously rejected it since. The 
Seventh Circuit explained: 
In light of the Illinois Appellate Court’s unanimity [contrary to 
Green] the best prediction differs from what it was when Green 
was decided, and so that decision is no longer authoritative, just 
as in a case in which a U.S. Supreme Court decision shows that a 
previous decision by a lower court was unsound, even though the 
Supreme Court doesn’t mention the decision.28 
Despite Taco Bell, the standard the Seventh Circuit applies in 
deciding whether to follow a state intermediate appellate court decision 
arguably remains unsettled. Some decisions from the Seventh Circuit 
indicate agreement with the Ninth Circuit’s presumption in favor of 
following intervening state intermediate appellate court decisions.29 
However, like Taco Bell, more recent decisions from the Seventh Circuit 
evince an approach less reflexively in favor of following state 
intermediate appellate court decisions. For example, in Reiser v. 
                                                                                                             
 24 See Blaine Constr. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 171 F.3d 343, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(panel is bound by prior panel’s decision predicting state law unless state courts have 
indicated that they would have decided the issue differently). 
 25 See Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997, 1003 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(“[F]ederal court can depart from an intermediate court’s fully reasoned holding as to 
state law only if ‘convinced’ that the state’s highest court would not follow that 
holding.”) (quoting West v. AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237(1940)) (other citation 
omitted). 
 26 388 F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 27 806 F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 28 388 F.3d at 1077 (citation omitted). 
 29 See, e.g., L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 574 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (“Decisions of intermediate appellate state courts generally control unless 
there are persuasive indications that the highest state court would decide the issue 
differently.”) (citation omitted). 
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Residential Funding Corp.,30 the Seventh Circuit described intermediate 
appellate court decisions as “just prognostications” that “could in 
principle persuade us to reconsider and overrule our precedent[.]”31 Two 
intervening intermediate appellate court decisions had rejected the 
Seventh Circuit’s own view on the issue of state law before it. Calling its 
own prior decision on the matter “an educated guess about how the 
Supreme Court of Illinois will rule[,]” and refusing even to consider the 
merits of the intervening intermediate appellate court decisions, the 
Reiser court chose to follow its own decision, reasoning that “[i]nstead of 
guessing over and over, it is best to stick with one assessment until the 
state’s supreme court, which alone can end the guessing game, does 
so.”32 
The Second, Third and Eighth Circuits arguably have not settled 
firmly on an approach to this issue. The Second Circuit has expressed a 
variety of views. In Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,33 the Second 
Circuit explained that “when a federal court must determine state law, it 
should not slavishly follow lower or even upper court decisions but 
ought to consider all the data the highest court of the state would use.”34 
This view contemplates a predictive role largely, if not entirely, unbound 
by prior panel precedent on the state law issue, but the Second Circuit 
has not relied on it since. Two decades later, in Woodling v. Garrett 
Corp.,35 the Second Circuit signaled greater deference to its own prior 
Erie predictions, reasoning that “[a] ruling of one panel of this Circuit on 
an issue of state law normally will not be reconsidered by another panel 
absent a subsequent decision of a state court or of this Circuit tending to 
cast doubt on that ruling.”36 
The Third Circuit’s approach also is arguably unsettled. In Aceto v. 
Zurich Insurance Co.,37 the Third Circuit observed that “[n]o one may 
properly rely upon what we have held as more than persuasive on a 
question of Pennsylvania law so long as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has not ruled upon that legal question.”38 More recent Third Circuit 
decisions have cast substantial doubt on Aceto, though they have not 
explicitly overruled it. In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. 
                                                                                                             
 30 380 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 31 Id. at 1029. 
 32 Id. 
 33 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam). 
 34 Id. at 851. 
 35 813 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 36 Id. at 557 (citations omitted). 
 37 440 F.2d 1320 (3d Cir. 1971). 
 38 Id. at 1322. 
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Inc.,39 for example, the court considered itself bound by a prior panel 
decision on New Jersey law, observing that “[a]s a panel of this court, we 
are obligated to follow a prior panel’s construction of New Jersey law 
and as a panel we cannot reject those views simply because we think the 
prior case may have been wrongly decided.”40 Relying on this passage 
from Ciba-Geigy, the Third Circuit stated in Gruber v. Owens-Illinois 
Inc.,41 “that, absent compelling distinctions, where one panel has 
interpreted a state statute, a subsequent panel may not reject that 
interpretation on the grounds that it believes the prior decision to be 
incorrect.”42 More recently, in Debiec v. Cabot Corp.,43 the court, 
quoting from its opinion in Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp.,44 stated that 
“in the absence of a clear statement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
to the contrary or other persuasive evidence of a change in the 
Pennsylvania law, we are bound by the holdings of previous panels of 
this court.”45 
Echoing the Third Circuit’s view in Aceto but going one step 
further, the Eighth Circuit, in Peterson v. U-Haul Co.,46 explained that 
“[i]n a diversity case neither this Court nor the District Court make any 
declarations of law. . . . Federal court decisions in diversity cases have no 
precedential value as state law and only determine the issues between the 
parties.”47 The Eighth Circuit does not appear to have cited this 
formulation from Peterson approvingly, though it recently opined in AIG 
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Fraley-Landers48 that it had “never specifically 
determined the binding effect of a state law determination by a prior 
panel[.]”49 Having deemed itself free to adopt a definitive approach to 
                                                                                                             
 39 747 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 40 Id. at 856 n.10. 
 41 899 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 42 Id. at 1372 n.7 (citing Ciba-Geigy, 747 F.2d at 856 n.10). 
 43 352 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 44 917 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 45 352 F.3d at 131 (quoting Smith, 917 F.2d at 1343) (internal citation and quotations 
omitted). Given the weight of more recent authority in the Third Circuit, it may be that 
the Third Circuit has abrogated Aceto sub silentio. As detailed below, however, many 
district courts in the Third Circuit still perceive an intra-circuit conflict and have adopted 
contrary positions on the precedential force of the Third Circuit’s Erie predictions. 
Moreover, if Aceto’s observation that Third Circuit Erie predictions are no more than 
persuasive can be characterized as its holding, the Third Circuit’s more recent decisions 
appearing to reject that view would not be controlling precedent. See Ryan v. Johnson, 
115 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen two decisions of this court conflict, we are 
bound by the earlier decision.”) (citations omitted). 
 46 409 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1969). 
 47 Id. at 1177. 
 48 450 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 49 Id. at 767. 
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dealing with prior panel state law decisions, the Eighth Circuit in AIG 
Centennial proceeded to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s (and other circuits’) 
deference “to prior panel decisions absent a ‘subsequent state court 
decision or statutory amendment that makes [the prior federal opinion] 
clearly wrong.’”50 
It is thus apparent that the federal courts of appeals take divergent 
approaches in weighing their own, prior Erie predictions against contrary 
decisions by the relevant state’s intermediate appellate courts. Others 
have thoroughly analyzed the correctness of these varying approaches,51 
and it is not the intention of this Article to rehash those analyses. It does 
bear noting, however, that those circuits who adhere more rigidly to their 
own, prior Erie predictions arguably transgress Erie and, more 
specifically, its progeny discussing the appropriate weight to accord 
intervening decisions from the relevant state’s intermediate appellate 
court. The Supreme Court instructed rather clearly in West that a “rule of 
law” announced by an intermediate appellate state court “is not to be 
disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive 
data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.”52 The use 
of the word “convince” indicates a high threshold, suggesting that any 
doubts about whether the state’s highest court would follow the view of 
the state intermediate appellate court ought to be resolved in favor of 
following the intermediate appellate court’s decision. West also requires 
federal courts to identify “persuasive evidence” that the state’s highest 
court would refuse to follow the view of the state intermediate appellate 
court—a federal court cannot simply reject a state intermediate appellate 
                                                                                                             
 50 Id. at 767-68 (quoting Broussard v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 665 F.2d 1387, 1389 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (alteration in original) (other citations omitted)). The Eighth Circuit did 
acknowledge in AIG Centennial the existence of a contrary approach less deferential to 
prior panel determinations with a “but see” cite to that portion of Jed Bergman’s Note, 
supra note 13, that discusses the argument for according less deference to circuit Erie 
precedent. Id. at 768. But it failed to cite and address its relatively recent decision in 
Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 223 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2000). There, 
the Eighth Circuit had noted that on the critical state law issue in the case, a more recent 
decision from the relevant state intermediate appellate court had rejected the Eighth 
Circuit’s own prior Erie prediction on the state law issue. The court concluded:  
While we are loath to reject the considered judgment of a prior panel 
decision of our court, our task is to apply state law, and while decisions of 
the “various intermediate appellate courts are not [binding on us], . . . they 
are persuasive authority, and we must follow them when they are the best 
evidence of what [state] law is.”  
Marvin Lumber, 223 F.3d at 883 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Arguably, 
AIG Centennial conflicts with this aspect of Marvin Lumber. 
 51 See, e.g., Bergman, supra note 13. 
 52 West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). 
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court decision out of hand and without explanation in favor of its own, 
prior Erie prediction. So understood, West would seem to preclude the 
approach the Fifth Circuit outlined in Abraham, where it concluded that 
it would adhere to its own Erie predictions notwithstanding intervening 
decisions from the state intermediate appellate court, and would only 
follow those decisions if they were unanimous or near-unanimous. The 
Supreme Court may eventually decide to resolve definitively the 
appropriate approach of federal courts of appeals to reconciling their own 
Erie predictions with intervening decisions from a state intermediate 
appellate court. Until then, practitioners would be wise to apprise 
themselves of the contrasting positions of the courts of appeals on this 
question. 
C. Federal Courts of Appeals’ Erie Predictions in the District Courts 
One might instinctively surmise that entrenched principles of stare 
decisis compel district courts to follow the relevant court of appeals’ Erie 
predictions. And, indeed, the state of the law throughout the country 
generally reflects this.53 The Seventh Circuit recently reiterated this 
command in Reiser and Taco Bell. In Reiser, the court admonished the 
district court for refusing to follow prior Seventh Circuit precedent 
construing the state law at issue in favor of two state intermediate 
appellate court decisions post-dating that Seventh Circuit precedent: 
By treating [the Seventh Circuit decision] as having no more 
than persuasive force, the district court made a fundamental 
error. In a hierarchical system, decisions of a superior court are 
authoritative on inferior courts. Just as the court of appeals must 
follow decisions of the Supreme Court whether or not we agree 
with them, so district judges must follow the decisions of this 
court whether or not they agree.54 
                                                                                                             
 53 See, e.g., Schwarz v. Nat’l Van Lines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 690, 699 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (in Erie prediction mode, “the Court is bound by the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of the content of unsettled state law.”); In re Exxon Coker Fire, 108 F. 
Supp. 2d 628, 629 (M.D. La. 2000) (in determining issue of Louisiana law in diversity 
case, “[t]his Court is also bound to follow the interpretations of Louisiana law by the 
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals absent some change in state law by the 
legislature or the Louisiana Supreme Court.”); Perez v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 967 F. Supp. 920, 926 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (“Adherence by a federal district court to a 
circuit court’s ‘Erie guess’ is appropriate, even when there exists a decision from the 
state’s intermediate level appellate court that is inconsistent with the circuit court’s 
resolution of the state law issue.”) (citation omitted). 
 54 Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(citations omitted). 
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Citing Reiser, the court in Taco Bell similarly chided the district 
court there for refusing to follow the Seventh Circuit’s prior Erie 
prediction in favor of intervening state intermediate appellate court 
decisions, explaining in no uncertain terms “that the district court was 
bound by [our prior Erie prediction], as a lower court cannot overrule the 
decision of a higher one.”55 
But not all district courts follow the strict directive of stare decisis 
articulated in Reiser and Taco Bell.56 Some district courts follow the 
same rule followed by their superior federal court of appeals—that a 
federal court of appeals’ Erie prediction is binding unless subsequent 
state court decisions or statutory amendments have rendered that 
prediction erroneous.57 When making Erie predictions of New York law, 
Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York views the Second 
Circuit as occupying the same position as a lower New York state court, 
                                                                                                             
 55 Taco Bell Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 388 F.3d 1069, 1077 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Reiser, 380 F.3d at 1029-30). 
 56 See, e.g., Johnson v. Symantec Corp., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(“Although a circuit court’s prediction of state law is not binding in the same way as is its 
definitive interpretation of federal law, as a practical matter a circuit court’s 
interpretations of state law must be accorded great deference by district courts within the 
circuit.”); Stubl v. T.A. Sys., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1075, 1093 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (observing 
that where two decisions of the Michigan intermediate appellate court on issue of 
Michigan law specifically contradict a prior Sixth Circuit decision on same issue, 
“federal district court should adopt the state court’s interpretation.”) (citations omitted); 
Nussbaum v. Mortgage Serv. Am. Co., 913 F. Supp. 1548, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1995) 
(refusing to slavishly follow Eleventh Circuit precedent on issue of Florida law where 
Florida intermediate appellate court had decided issue in the interim contrary to Eleventh 
Circuit’s resolution); In re N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 847 F. Supp. 1086, 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (“When a conflict exists between holdings of the Second Circuit and more recent 
determinations of state appellate courts, the interpretation of the Circuit is not binding on 
federal district courts.”) (citation omitted). Cf. Hollingsworth v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., No. 04-3733, 2005 WL 563414, at *6 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2005) (observing that it 
did not have to “consider the debatable question of whether a federal district court is 
strictly bound by its court of appeals’ prediction of state law.”); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 
62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that “[i]t must be remembered that no 
federal court can speak to questions of state law with any certitude[,]” and that “for this 
reason . . . it has sometimes been suggested that in Erie matters the district courts need 
not follow as strictly as they would interpretations of federal law by federal courts of 
appeals[.]”) (citations omitted). 
 57 See, e.g., Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass’n v. Lexington Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 2d 851, 
855 (N.D. Tex. 2004), overruled on other grounds, 398 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2005), vacated 
and remanded, 415 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that “if a panel of the Fifth 
Circuit has settled on the state law to be applied in a diversity case, that precedent should 
be followed ‘absent a subsequent state court decision or statutory amendment that 
rendered the [the Fifth Circuit’s] prior decision clearly wrong.’”) (quoting Batts v. Tow-
Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
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and thus considers himself unbound by the Second Circuit’s Erie 
predictions of New York law: 
Where a conflict exists between holdings of the Second 
Circuit and more recent determinations of state appellate courts, 
this court will follow the outcome it believes the New York 
Court of Appeals would reach, without giving binding authority 
to the Second Circuit’s construction of the state statute. The 
federal Court of Appeals is in the same position as a lower state 
court vis-à-vis the New York Court of Appeals in construing 
state substantive law under Erie.58 
The district court in Westport Insurance Corp. v. Atchley, Russell, 
Waldrop & Hlavinka, L.L.P.,59 considered itself free to depart from the 
Fifth Circuit. The court concluded that “[i]nstead of relying exclusively 
on older [Fifth] circuit opinions, . . . [it would] look[ ] to recent trends in 
the jurisprudence of the Texas Supreme Court and Texas’ lower courts 
for guidance.”60 After an exhaustive analysis of the relevant state and 
federal decisional authority, the district court determined that the correct 
view was that set forth in a concurring opinion in a state intermediate 
appellate court decision, despite the fact that that view contradicted the 
position adopted by the Fifth Circuit.61 
The most fertile ground for disagreement among district courts in 
the same circuit is in the Third Circuit, particularly among district courts 
in Pennsylvania. In Hittle v. Scripto-Tokai Corp.,62 the court faced a 
question of Pennsylvania law on which the Third Circuit had already 
issued an Erie prediction, but that had not been resolved by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Hittle court set forth the settled 
standards for making an Erie prediction, but observed that “[l]ess clear    
. . . is the extent to which a federal district court is bound by its court of 
appeals’ interpretation of state law, especially if a subsequent state 
appellate court contradicts the federal appellate court.”63 The court noted 
that although the Third Circuit has indicated little about the topic, it “has 
suggested[, in Aceto,] that the only law that is binding on a federal court 
is the jurisprudence of the state supreme court, and that even a decision 
                                                                                                             
 58 In re E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1391 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 
1991), rev’d on other grounds, In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831 
(2d Cir. 1992). 
 59 267 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Tex. 2003). 
 60 Id. at 615. 
 61 Id. at 621. 
 62 166 F. Supp. 2d 159 (M.D. Pa. 2001). 
 63 Id. at 162. 
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by a federal court of appeals does not bind a district court.”64 Hittle 
acknowledged the division among district courts in the Third Circuit on 
the precedential force of the Third Circuit’s Erie predictions, but it 
ultimately concluded that it need not follow the Third Circuit’s view on 
the state law question before it.65 
Like Hittle, many district courts have considered themselves not 
bound by the Third Circuit’s Erie predictions.66 A number of district 
courts have taken the contrary position, however.67 Yet other district 
courts in the Third Circuit appear to adhere to a strict stare decisis 
approach, but ultimately endorse a district court’s freedom to depart from 
a court of appeals’ Erie prediction. In Stepanuk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co.,68 for example, the district court, noting the Third Circuit’s 
reasoning in Ciba-Geigy and Gruber that a Third Circuit panel is bound 
                                                                                                             
 64 Id. (citing Aceto v. Zurich Ins. Co., 440 F.2d 1320, 1321 (3d Cir. 1971)). 
 65 Id. 
 66 See Zimmer v. Cooperneff Advisors, Inc., No. 04-3816, 2004 WL 2933979, at *8 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2004) (refusing to follow Third Circuit holding on state law where 
contradicted by intervening, state intermediate appellate court decision); Carrasquilla v. 
Mazda Motor Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 169, 173 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (the court, like Swinton, 
endorsed Hittle and considered itself free to depart from Third Circuit’s Erie prediction); 
Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 558 n.18 (D. 
Del. 1989) (citing and discussing Aceto approvingly, and refusing to follow Fourth 
Circuit precedent predicting applicable state law because it had “perhaps even less reason 
than the trial court in Aceto to be bound by the circuit court’s prior interpretation of state 
law.”); Largoza v. Gen. Elec. Co., 538 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (“[I]t is 
axiomatic that this court is bound by a decision of the Third Circuit predicting 
Pennsylvania law unless the state supreme court issues a contrary decision or it appears 
from a subsequent decision of the appellate courts that the court of appeals erred.”) 
(citations omitted); In re Swinton, 287 B.R. 634, 636-37 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2003) (noting 
that the Third Circuit “has not directly answered” the question of whether its Erie 
predictions bind district courts and that “district courts have come to different 
conclusions[;]” quoting and endorsing the analysis in Hittle, and thus deeming itself free 
to “consider [a Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decision handed down after the 
applicable Third Circuit Erie prediction precedent] to determine whether the Court of 
Appeals’ earlier prediction of Pennsylvania law [ ] was in error.”). 
 67 See, e.g., Fremont v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 988 F. Supp. 870, 875 (E.D. 
Pa. 1997) (“[A]ccording to the Third Circuit, whose predictions of state law this court is 
bound to follow.”); Itzkoff v. F & G Realty of N.J., Corp., 890 F. Supp. 351, 356 (D.N.J. 
1995) (“[T]he Court is of course bound by any Third Circuit decisions regarding how the 
New Jersey Supreme Court would rule.”) (citation omitted); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Livelsberger, 
Inc., 868 F. Supp. 686, 689 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (“Our Court of Appeals has already made its 
prediction on this point [of state law], and that prediction is the only one that matters 
here.”) (citation omitted); Sprague, Levinson & Thall v. Advest, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 11, 14 
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (“Decisions of an intermediate appellate court are entitled to considerable 
weight but in the absence of a clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, I believe I must follow” Third Circuit decisions predicting the issue of 
Pennsylvania law controlling the outcome). 
 68 No. 92-6095, 1995 WL 553010 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1995). 
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by a prior panel’s construction of state law, stated that it was “axiomatic 
that if another panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is 
bound by a previous panel’s construction of state law then district courts 
within the Third Circuit are also bound by that construction.”69 But the 
court still left open the possibility that a district court could depart from a 
federal court of appeals’ Erie prediction “if later state court decisions 
indicate that the Court of Appeals’ earlier predication [sic] of state law 
was in error.”70 
As in the previous section, the question bears asking: Would a 
district court run afoul of Erie and its progeny, namely West, were it to 
adhere blindly to a federal court of appeals’ Erie prediction despite an 
intervening, state intermediate appellate court decision disagreeing with 
that federal court of appeals’ prediction? Recall that the directive in West 
concerning the treatment of state intermediate appellate court decisions 
in this context did not speak solely to federal courts of appeal—rather, it 
spoke to “federal court[s],” presumably including district courts as well. 
If West compels district courts to treat a state intermediate appellate court 
decision as “persuasive evidence” of what the state’s highest court would 
do, and forbids them from deviating from the intermediate appellate 
court decision unless “convinced” that the state’s highest court would 
reject it, then a district court may not blindly adhere to a federal court of 
appeals’ Erie prediction. 
However, West’s applicability to district courts faced with a federal 
court of appeals’ Erie prediction must be analyzed by reference to the 
established principle of stare decisis that requires district courts to adhere 
to their superior federal court of appeals’ decisions, a principle often 
referred to as “vertical” stare decisis. One might consider this principle 
of stare decisis to be based merely on sound or wise policy—as mere 
procedural scaffolding established by the federal courts of appeals and 
district courts to facilitate the decision making process. On this view, 
vertical stare decisis surely cannot circumscribe Supreme Court 
precedent which counsels, at least in some cases, departure from superior 
court precedent in the course of rendering an Erie prediction. But what if 
this stare decisis principle is of constitutional provenance, rooted, as 
some have suggested, in Article III of the United States Constitution?71 
                                                                                                             
 69 Id. at *2. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 754 (1988) (suggesting that Article III may compel stare decisis 
generally); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2125 n.167 (2002) (“Vertical stare decisis is probably required by 
Article III, Section 1” of the United States Constitution) (citations omitted). 
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Whether “vertical” stare decisis is a constitutional command is an issue 
well beyond the scope of this Article, but many have tilled its soil.72 For 
purposes of this Article, it is at least worth asking whether, if vertical 
stare decisis is constitutionally mandated, district courts are nonetheless 
free or obligated by Erie and West to deviate from their circuit court of 
appeals’ Erie predictions. 
II. FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS’ PRONOUNCEMENTS ON FEDERAL 
LAW 
This Article has focused exclusively on the precedential treatment 
by federal courts of decisions by federal courts of appeals construing 
state law. The focus now shifts to a converse scenario: how do state 
courts treat the federal courts of appeals’ federal law pronouncements? 
As Professor Zeigler stated in his seminal treatment of the question, 
“[s]tate courts vary greatly in the weight they give to lower federal court 
decisions[.]”73 The Supreme Court has never definitively resolved this 
question, but a handful of its opinions have addressed it on several 
occasions.74 In Lockhart v. Fretwell, a review of a habeas petition 
seeking relief from a conviction rendered in the Arkansas state courts, 
Justice Thomas observed in his concurring opinion that the Eighth 
Circuit was “mistaken” in its apparent conclusion below “that the 
Arkansas trial court would have been compelled to follow” the Eighth 
Circuit’s own prior precedent on an issue of federal law.75 He explained 
his reasoning: 
The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal 
law, but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of 
federal law requires that a state court’s interpretation of federal 
                                                                                                             
 72 See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994); John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over 
the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000); Rosenkranz, supra note 71; Bradley 
Scott Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated By Rule?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 646 n.2 
(2006). 
 73 Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards 
State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1143 
(1999). 
 74 See Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 58 n.11 (1997) 
(referring to Ninth Circuit’s suggestion below that federal court decisions on issue of 
federal law bind state courts as “remarkable”); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 482 (1974) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (observing that “[s]tate authorities may choose to be guided 
by the judgment of a lower federal court, but they are not compelled to follow the 
decision by threat of contempt or other penalties.”). 
 75 Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 375-76. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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law give way to a (lower) federal court’s interpretation. In our 
federal system, a state trial court’s interpretation of federal law is 
no less authoritative than that of the federal court of appeals in 
whose circuit the trial court is located. An Arkansas trial court is 
bound by this Court’s (and by the Arkansas Supreme Court’s and 
Arkansas Court of Appeals’) interpretation of federal law, but if 
it follows the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of federal law, it 
does so only because it chooses to and not because it must.76 
Since publication of Professor Zeigler’s Article seven years ago, 
there has been an obvious trend in the states toward the view that state 
courts are not in any way bound or controlled by federal court of appeals 
(or district court) decisions construing federal law. Presently, at least 
twenty-nine states expressly consider themselves unbound by federal 
court of appeals’ decisions on issues of federal law.77 These twenty-nine 
                                                                                                             
 76 Id. at 376 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 77 Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 963 (Alaska 1995) (“We are not obliged to follow 
. . . a decision of the Ninth Circuit construing a federal statutory provision], since this 
court is not bound by decisions of federal courts other than the United States Supreme 
Court on questions of federal law.”) (citation omitted); State v. Montano, 77 P.3d 1246, 
1247 n.1 (Ariz. 2003) (“We are not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of what 
the Constitution requires.”) (citations omitted); Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Serv., Inc., 22 Cal. 
4th 316, 320-21 (Cal. 2000) (“While we are not bound by decisions of the lower federal 
courts, even on federal questions, they are persuasive and entitled to great weight”; 
“Where lower federal precedents are divided or lacking, state courts must necessarily 
make an independent determination of federal law, but where the decisions of the lower 
federal courts on a federal question are ‘both numerous and consistent,’ we should 
hesitate to reject their authority.”) (citations omitted); Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 
672 (Colo. 1998) (“Although the Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to 
federal law, neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that 
a state court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a federal court’s interpretation 
other than that of the United States Supreme Court. Thus, we are not bound by . . . 
decisions of the lower federal courts.”); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Nat’l 
Treasury Employees Union, 458 S.E. 2d 95, 96 (Ga. 1995) (“[T]he decisions of the 
federal courts of appeal are not binding on this court, but their reasoning is persuasive.”) 
(citation omitted); State v. Simeona, 864 P.2d 1109, 1117 (Haw. 1993), overruled on 
other grounds, State v. Ford, 929 P.2d 78 (Haw. 1996) (concluding that it was not bound 
by Ninth Circuit decision construing United States Constitution) (citations omitted); Dan 
Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting Holding, Inc., 127 P.3d 138, 143 
(Idaho 2005) (“[T]he decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on state courts, 
even on issues of federal law.”) (citation omitted); Indiana Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. 
Payne, 622 N.E. 2d 461, 468 (Ind. 1993) (“Although U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
pertaining to federal questions are binding on state courts, lower federal court decisions 
may be persuasive but have non-binding authority on state courts.”) (citation omitted); 
Top of Iowa Coop. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W. 2d 454, 460 (Iowa 2000) (“Although 
we give respectful consideration to the decisions of federal district courts and federal 
courts of appeals on this issue [of federal law], we have the authority to decide this case 
based on our own interpretation of federal law.”) (citations omitted); Shell Oil Co. v. 
Secretary, Revenue and Taxation, 683 So. 2d 1204, 1209-10 & n.11 (La. 1996) (“While 
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we may regard decisions of the federal Fifth Circuit as persuasive in certain cases, 
particularly cases addressing purely federal questions, we are not bound by its decision    
. . . . In matters involving federal law, state courts are bound only by decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court. Federal appellate court decisions are persuasive only.”); 
Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1061 n.10 (Md. 1979) (“We note that unlike decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, decisions of federal circuit courts of appeals 
construing the federal constitution and acts of the Congress pursuant thereto, are not 
binding upon us.”) (citations omitted); Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 
770 N.E. 2d 980, 986 n.8 (Mass. 2002) (“Although we are not bound by decisions of 
Federal courts (other than the United States Supreme Court) on matters of Federal law, 
‘we give respectful consideration to such lower Federal court decisions as seem 
persuasive.’”) (citations omitted); Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp., 677 N.W. 2d 325, 327 
(Mich. 2004) (“Although state courts are bound by the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court construing federal law, there is no similar obligation with respect to 
decisions of the lower federal courts.”) (citations omitted); Citizens for a Balanced City 
v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W. 2d 13, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“We 
are not . . . bound by any other federal courts’ opinion, even when interpreting federal 
statutes.”) (citation omitted); Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc., 79 S.W. 3d 
907, 910 & n.4 (Mo. 2002) (“In construing a federal statute, lower federal court opinions 
construing a federal statute are examined respectfully for such aid and guidance as may 
be found therein”; but stating that to the extent the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision 
in Fox v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 S.W. 2d 408, 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) 
“suggests [lower federal court decisions construing federal statutes] are binding, it is 
overruled.”) (citation omitted); State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 30 (Mont. 2003) 
(“Supremacy Clause does not require state courts to follow precedent from the circuit 
courts of appeal interpreting the United States Constitution.”); Strong v. Omaha Constr. 
Indus. Pension Plan, 701 N.W. 2d 320, 328 (Neb. 2005) (overruling its earlier decisions 
suggesting that lower federal court decisions were binding on state courts, and 
concluding that “while Nebraska courts must treat U.S. Supreme Court decisions as 
binding authority, lower federal court decisions are only persuasive authority.”); Custom 
Cabinet Factory of N.Y., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of State of Nev., 62 P.3d 741, 
742-43 (Nev. 2003) (“Decisions of the federal district court and panels of the federal 
circuit court of appeals are not binding upon this court. Even an en banc decision of a 
federal circuit court does not bind Nevada courts.”) (footnote omitted); Dewey v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d  1239, 1243-44 (N.J. 1990) (noting that “New Jersey 
precedent appears to hold that state courts are bound by the federal courts’ interpretations 
of federal statutes,” but clarifying that inferior federal court decisions on questions of 
federal law are not “‘binding’ per se[,]” and, pursuant to comity, should just “be accorded 
due respect, particularly where they are in agreement.”); State v. McDowell, 310 S.E.2d 
301, 310 (N.C. 1984) (in performing obligation to protect defendants’ federal 
constitutional rights, “state court should exercise and apply its own independent 
judgment, treating, of course, decisions of the United States Supreme Court as binding 
and according to decisions of lower federal courts such persuasiveness as these decisions 
might reasonably command.”) (citation omitted); State v. Burnett, 755 N.E. 2d 857, 862 
(Ohio 2001) (“[W]e are not bound by rulings on federal statutory or constitutional law 
made by a federal court other than the United States Supreme Court.”); Bogart v. 
Caprock Commc’ns Corp., 69 P.3d 266, 271 (Okla. 2003) (“[B]y virtue of the Supremacy 
Clause, we are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with respect to 
the federal constitution and federal law, and we must pronounce rules of law that 
conform to extant Supreme Court jurisprudence. We also recognize that nothing in the 
concept of supremacy or in any other principle of law requires subordination of state 
courts to the inferior federal courts.”); Page v. Palmateer, 84 P.3d 133, 139 (Or. 2004) 
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states’ courts have generally echoed Justice Thomas’s reasoning in 
Lockhart in concluding rather summarily that the Supremacy Clause 
simply does not compel adherence to “inferior” federal court conclusions 
of federal law.78 
While the majority of states do not consider themselves bound by 
the federal courts of appeals’ holdings on federal law questions, there is 
authority in state appellate courts in Arkansas,79 Delaware,80 
                                                                                                             
(federal court of appeals’ decisions construing federal constitution “not binding in this 
court”) (citation omitted); Hall v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 865 (Pa. 
2004) (“[W]e are not obligated to follow the decisions of the Third Circuit on issues of 
federal law.”); Strouth v. State, 999 S.W.2d 759, 765 n.9 (Tenn. 1999) (refusing to follow 
Sixth Circuit decision on federal constitutional issue, stating that it was “not bound by 
decisions of the federal district and circuit courts.”); Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 
868 S.W. 2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (in federal maritime action, stating that “[w]hile Texas 
courts may certainly draw upon the precedents of the Fifth Circuit, or any other federal or 
state court, in determining the appropriate federal rule of decision, they are obligated to 
follow only higher Texas courts and the United States Supreme Court”) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original); State v. Austin, 685 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Vt. 1996) (noting 
it is “axiomatic that the decision of the federal district court is not binding precedent upon 
this Court.”) (citations omitted); In re Grisby, 853 P.2d 901, 907 (Wash. 1993) (“While 
we always give careful consideration to Ninth Circuit decisions, we are not obligated to 
follow them, and do not do so in this case.”); Elections Bd. of Wis. v. Wis. Mfrs. & 
Commerce, 597 N.W. 2d 721, 731 n.19 (Wis. 1999) (“On federal questions, this court is 
bound only by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The value of the 
opinions of federal courts of appeals and district courts is limited to their 
persuasiveness.”) (citations omitted). 
 78 See, e.g., Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 671 (Colo. 1998) (“[N]either federal 
supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state court’s 
interpretation of federal law give way to a federal court’s interpretation other than that of 
the United States Supreme Court.”); State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 30 (Mont. 2003)  
(“Supremacy Clause does not require state courts to follow precedent from the circuit 
courts of appeal interpreting the United States Constitution.”); Bogart v. Caprock 
Comm’cns Corp., 69 P.3d 266, 271 (Okla. 2003) (“[N]othing in the concept of [federal] 
supremacy or in any other principle of law requires subordination of state courts to the 
inferior federal courts.”). 
 79 Malvern Gravel Co. v. Mitchell, 385 S.W. 2d 144 (Ark. 1964). Malvern involved 
the application of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and whether the defendant gravel 
company and railroad was a “common carrier” under that Act. The Arkansas Supreme 
Court stated that it was “bound by the decisions of the Federal Courts” in construing the 
scope of the FELA and proceeded to discuss and rely upon multiple decisions from 
federal district courts and the Sixth Circuit considering the meaning of “common carrier” 
under the FELA. Id. at 147-48. 
 80 Atlas Mut. Ben. Ass’n v. Portscheller, 46 A.2d 643 (Del. 1945). In Atlas Mutual, 
the Delaware Supreme Court stated that “questions relating to due process of law under 
the Federal Constitution should be resolved in accordance with decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States and other federal courts . . . .”  Id. at 646 (citations omitted). 
The court went on to discuss and rely on a host of lower federal court decisions in 
deciding the due process issues before it. Id. at 646-50. See also Klein v. Sunbeam Corp., 
93 A.2d 732, 733 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951) (citing Atlas Mutual for the proposition that 
federal due process questions “should be resolved in accordance with decisions of the 
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Mississippi,81 New Hampshire,82 South Carolina83 and Utah84 suggesting 
that courts in those states adhere to the rule that they are bound by those 
holdings.85 
A number of other states appear to be divided on the issue. For 
example, Florida appellate courts have taken contradictory positions. In 
Humphreys v. State, the Florida Supreme Court, after setting forth a 
particular proposition of federal constitutional law, stated that “such is 
the holding of the unbroken current of decisions of the [S]upreme Court 
of the United States and of other [f]ederal [c]ourts, by which decisions 
we are bound, when called upon to adjudicate questions of constitutional 
law arising under section 10 of Article I of the [C]onstitution of the 
United States.”86 The Florida District Court of Appeal adhered to this 
view several decades later in Ratner v. Arrington,87 citing Humphreys for 
the proposition that “we are not free to place upon the federal statute the 
interpretation thus contended for by appellants, as we must give effect to 
the construction given it by the federal appellate courts[,]” and, relying 
on several decisions from federal courts of appeals and district courts 
construing a federal statute, rejected an argument that testimony was 
                                                                                                             
Federal Courts” and similarly discussing and relying on lower federal court decisions for 
its holding). 
 81 King v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc., 697 So. 2d 439, 440 (Miss. 1997) (“This 
Court’s task in the present case is simplified greatly by the fact that there is a Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision on point, which this Court considers to be controlling 
with regard to the present issue of federal law.”). 
 82 Desmarais v. Joy Mfg. Co., 538 A.2d 1218 (N.H. 1988). Desmarais involved a 
claim under the federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). At the 
outset of the court’s analysis, it observed that “in exercising our jurisdiction with respect 
to what is essentially a federal question, we are guided and bound by federal statutes and 
decisions of the federal courts interpreting those statutes.”  Id. at 1220. The court went on 
to cite liberally to decisions from various federal courts of appeals and district courts. Id. 
at 1220-23. 
 83 South Carolina v. Ford Motor Co., 38 S.E.2d 242, 247 (S.C. 1946) (in case 
involving federal constitutional challenges to application of state statute, stating that 
federal court authorities “are controlling of the meaning and effect of the Federal 
Constitution.”). 
 84 Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 172 P. 725, 727 (Utah 1918) 
(“If . . . there is a decision from a federal court which is decisive of the [federal] question 
here [i.e., scope of FELA], and especially if the federal decision is one that is more recent 
than the one cited from a state court, it is our duty to follow the federal court rather than 
the state court, since the question involved is one upon which the federal courts have the 
ultimate right to speak.”). 
 85 While these decisions have not been expressly overruled, many of them are 
obviously quite old. The general trend in the state courts gives good reason to believe that 
if the courts that rendered these decisions considered the issue today, they would join the 
trend and conclude that federal courts’ federal law holdings do not bind them. 
 86 145 So. 858, 861 (Fla. 1933) (citation omitted). 
 87 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
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inadmissible under that federal statute.88 In State v. Dwyer,89 the Florida 
Supreme Court, without even citing Humphreys or its reasoning 
concerning the force of federal court of appeals’ federal law holdings, 
concluded that “[e]ven though lower federal court rulings may be in 
some instances persuasive, such rulings are not binding on state 
courts.”90 But just a year later, the Florida Supreme Court, this time 
without mentioning Dwyer or Humphreys, but instead citing Ratner, 
stated in dicta that “[w]e recognize, of course, that state courts are bound 
by federal court determinations of federal law questions.”91 State 
appellate courts in Kansas,92 Kentucky,93 South Dakota94 and West 
Virginia95 appear to be similarly divided in their approaches to applying 
federal court of appeals’ federal law holdings. 
                                                                                                             
 88 Id. at 84-85 (citations omitted). 
 89 332 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1976). 
 90 Id. at 335. 
 91 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 375 n.9 (Fla. 1977) (citing Ratner, 111 
So. 2d 82). 
 92 Compare Krouse v. Lowden, 109 P.2d 138, 143 (Kan. 1941) (“[A]s to federal 
statutes the interpretation placed upon them by federal courts, and particularly by the 
United States [S]upreme Court, is controlling upon state courts.”) (citation omitted), with 
Local Lodge No. 774 v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 352 P.2d 420, 424 (Kan. 1960) (“as to 
national policy the decisions of the federal courts are entitled to great weight in cases 
construing the [federal] Labor Management Relations Act.”). 
 93 Compare Stephenson v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 2002-CA-001796-MR., 2003 WL 
22113458, at *6 n.4 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2003) (concluding that trial court’s belief that 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was controlling was 
“erroneous” because “the decisions of the lower federal courts, although persuasive, are 
not binding.”) (citations omitted), with Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Home Fruit & Produce 
Co., 220 S.W. 2d 558, 560 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949) (discussing federal court of appeals’ 
decision construing federal Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”) and stating that because 
shipment at issue in the case fell under the ICA, “rulings of the Federal court thereon are 
persuasive if not binding on this court.”). 
 94 Compare St. Cloud v. Leapley, 521 N.W. 2d 118, 122 (S.D. 1994) (in case 
involving question of federal criminal jurisdiction that United States District Court for the 
District of South Dakota had previously resolved, stating that “with respect to what is 
essentially a federal question, we are guided and bound by federal statutes and decisions 
of the federal courts interpreting those statutes.”), and Fall River County v. S.D. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 552 N.W. 2d 620, 628 (S.D. 1996) (quoting St. Cloud’s view of binding effect 
of federal court precedent construing federal law), with State v. Greger, 559 N.W.2d 854, 
859 (S.D. 1997) (refusing to consider itself bound by Eighth Circuit’s decision on federal 
jurisdictional issue in case, and noting, but not expressly overruling, the principle in St. 
Cloud). 
 95 Compare Abrams v. W. Va. Racing Comm’n, 263 S.E. 2d 103, 106 (W. Va. 1980) 
(“Nor can there be doubt that an interpretation of the United States Constitution by a 
federal court will override that of a state court.”) (citation omitted), with Cook v. Lilly, 
208 S.E. 2d 784, 786 (W. Va. 1974) (in case raising Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clause challenge to state statute, following as persuasive the “unanimous holding of all 
United States Circuit Courts” on the particular issue, but stating that “this Court is not 
bound by lower federal court rulings.”). 
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Several states appear to have adopted a hybrid approach, 
concluding that they will follow federal court precedent but only when it 
is uniform, i.e., when all federal courts that have addressed a point of 
federal law have reached the same conclusion. In Ex parte Bozeman,96 
the Alabama Supreme Court stated that “[i]f the United States Supreme 
Court had already ruled on [the particular issue concerning interpretation 
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers], or if all federal circuits were 
in agreement on this issue, we would accept” such view, thus suggesting 
that it would, in effect, consider itself bound by uniform federal court of 
appeals decisions on federal law.97 
In Investment Co. of the Southwest v. Reese,98 the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico expressly stated that its conclusion on the issue of federal 
law before it was “guided by the unanimity of opinion among the federal 
courts.”99 In so doing, it quoted approvingly the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court’s statement in Demarais that “we are guided and bound 
by federal statutes and decisions of the federal courts interpreting those 
statutes.”100 Thus, Investment Co. of the Southwest can be read to suggest 
that the Supreme Court of New Mexico will follow uniform federal court 
decisions on federal law, i.e., that the Supreme Court of New Mexico 
will consider itself bound by that uniform federal decisional authority. 
The Court of Appeals of New York appears to follow a similar approach 
when federal decisional law is uniform on an issue of federal law.101 
Connecticut has staked an approach somewhere between the two 
extremes, treating Second Circuit pronouncements on federal law as 
strongly persuasive. Like many other states, Connecticut’s earlier view 
was unequivocal that the rulings of federal district courts and courts of 
appeals on the meaning of federal law bound them when faced with 
federal law questions.102 A recent line of decisions from the Connecticut 
                                                                                                             
 96 781 So. 2d 165 (Ala. 2000). 
 97 Id. at 168. 
 98 875 P.2d 1086 (N.M. 1994). 
 99 Id. at 1090 (citing Desmarais v. Joy Mfg. Co., 538 A.2d 1218, 1220 (N.H. 1988)). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 495 N.E. 2d 345, 348 (N.Y. 1986) 
(“When there is neither decision of the Supreme Court nor uniformity in the decisions of 
the lower Federal courts, however, a State court required to interpret the Federal statute 
has the same responsibility as the lower Federal courts and is not precluded from 
exercising its own judgment or bound to follow the decision of the Federal Circuit Court 
of Appeals within the territorial boundaries of which it sits.”) (citations omitted). 
 102 See Brownell v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 124 A.2d 901, 906 (Conn. 1956) 
(citing numerous decisions from federal district courts and courts of appeals and stating 
that “[i]t is needless to say that the interpretation given to federal legislation by the 
federal courts is binding upon state courts.”). 
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Supreme Court, however, reflects that Connecticut courts generally103 no 
longer consider Second Circuit decisions on federal law binding, though 
they will treat them as strongly persuasive. In Red Maple Properties v. 
Zoning Commission of Brookfield,104 the Connecticut Supreme Court 
observed that: 
“The decisions of the federal circuit in which a state court is 
located are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of a 
federal statute. This is particularly true in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases, 
where the federal statute confers concurrent jurisdiction on the 
federal and state courts. It would be a bizarre result if this court 
[adopted one interpretation] when in another courthouse, a few 
blocks away, the federal court, being bound by the Second 
Circuit rule, [adopted a different one].”105 
In Turner v. Frowein,106 the court endorsed the Red Maple 
Properties approach and, for the first time, specifically stated that 
Second Circuit decisions on federal law did not bind the court.107 In 
Szewczyk v.Department of Social Services,108 the Connecticut Supreme 
Court reiterated its view “that, while persuasive, decisions of the Second 
Circuit are not necessarily binding upon us.”109 But in the same breath, it 
stated that “[d]eparture from Second Circuit precedent on issues of 
federal law . . . should be constrained in order to prevent the plaintiff’s 
decision to file an action in federal District Court rather than a state court 
located ‘a few blocks away’ from having the ‘bizarre’ consequence of 
being outcome determinative.”110 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
appears to apply a similar rule of strong deference to its federal circuit 
court’s holdings on matters of federal law.111 
                                                                                                             
 103 But see Eacott v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 673 A.2d 587, 590 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (in 
deciding a question of federal preemption, holding that “[b]ecause the issue of 
preemption is a matter of federal law, we are bound by the decision [of the Second 
Circuit] in Bleiler [v. Cristwood Constr., Inc., 72 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1995)] under the 
supremacy clause of article six of the United States Constitution.”). 
 104 610 A.2d 1238 (Conn. 1992). 
 105 Id. at 1242 n.7 (citation omitted). 
 106 752 A.2d 955 (Conn. 2000). 
 107 Id. at 971. 
 108 881 A.2d 259 (Conn. 2005). 
 109 Id. at 266 n.11 (citation omitted). 
 110 Id. (citation omitted). 
 111 See Littlefield v. Maine Dep’t of Human Servs., 480 A.2d 731, 737 (Me. 1984) 
(stating that “in the interests of existing harmonious federal-state relationships, it is a 
wise policy that a state court of last resort accept, so far as reasonably possible, a decision 
of its federal circuit court on such a federal question.”) (citation omitted). 
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Illinois has adopted what appears to be a unique approach to 
dealing with federal courts’ federal law holdings. Illinois courts consider 
themselves free to depart from federal court decisions on federal 
constitutional issues.112 However, the Illinois Supreme Court appears to 
have issued inconsistent pronouncements on the precedential force of 
federal court decisions on federal statutory issues. In Busch v. Graphic 
Color Corp.,113 the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the 
Federal Hazardous Substances Act (“FHSA”) preempted a state common 
law failure to warn claim against a product manufacturer. The court 
stated “preliminarily” in its analysis of this question “that the decisions 
of the Federal courts interpreting a Federal act such as the FHSA are 
controlling upon Illinois courts, ‘in order that the act be given uniform 
application.’”114 After discussing numerous decisions from the federal 
courts of appeals addressing the same or similar issues, the court 
followed those decisions and found the state law claim preempted. 
In Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc.,115 the Illinois 
Supreme Court appeared to narrow the breadth of the principle 
enunciated in Busch while considering whether the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
preempted state common law claims for breach of warranty and defective 
design and construction. A few years earlier, the Seventh Circuit had 
reached a conclusion critical to resolving this preemption issue contrary 
to the one ultimately reached by the court in Weiland. The Weiland court 
acknowledged this, but rejected defendant’s assertion that it was bound 
by the Seventh Circuit’s holding. It noted that while “[u]niformity is an 
important consideration when state courts interpret federal statutes[,] . . .   
a concern for uniformity does not command this court’s adherence to the 
Seventh Circuit’s precedent in this case.”116 Moreover, the court 
reasoned, the Seventh Circuit “exercises no appellate jurisdiction over 
this court.”117 The court then stated that it “need not follow Seventh 
Circuit precedent interpreting a federal statute where, as here, the 
Supreme Court has not ruled on the question presented, there is a split of 
                                                                                                             
 112 See People v. Williams, 641 N.E.2d 296, 321 (Ill. 1994) (“[D]ecisions of lower 
Federal courts on Federal constitutional questions are not binding on State courts.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 113 662 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. 1996). 
 114 Id. at 403 (citations omitted). 
 115 721 N.E.2d 1149 (Ill. 1999). 
 116 Id. at 1154. 
 117 Id. 
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authority among the federal circuit courts of appeals, and, we believe, the 
case from the Seventh Circuit was wrongly decided.”118 
Two federal statutory preemption decisions by the Illinois Supreme 
Court in 2001 appeared to adopt contradictory approaches to the issue. In 
Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of DuPage,119 the court once again 
observed in dicta that “federal court decisions interpreting a federal act 
are actually binding upon our Illinois courts . . . .”120 Several months 
later, in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,121 the court, without even 
mentioning Sundance Homes, reasoned that “[a]lthough we have stated 
in the past that the decisions of federal courts interpreting a federal 
statute are controlling on Illinois courts,” this view “overstates the degree 
of deference this court must pay to federal decisions.”122 It then 
emphasized that uniformity in the application of federal law was the 
animating principle in deciding whether to follow federal court 
precedent, particularly where “the federal statute relates to a product that 
is inherently mobile and thus likely to move from state to state.”123 In the 
case before the court, this interest in a uniform application of federal 
statutes led it to “give considerable weight to the decisions of federal 
courts of appeals and federal district courts . . . .”124 
The most recent pronouncements from the Illinois Supreme Court 
appear to maintain the inconsistency that has marked the court’s 
treatment of federal court of appeals precedent. In Borowiec v. Gateway 
2000, Inc.,125 the court considered whether breach of warranty claims 
under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade 
Commission Improvement Act were arbitrable under the Federal 
Arbitration Act. After discussing three federal court of appeals decisions 
construing Magnuson-Moss, the court quoted its statement in Busch that 
“decisions of the Federal Courts interpreting a Federal Act . . . are 
controlling upon Illinois courts, ‘in order that the act be given uniform 
application.’”126 Because the federal court of appeals decisions 
construing Magnuson-Moss were uniform, the court in Borowiec 
followed those decisions. More recently, however, in Bowman v. 
                                                                                                             
 118 Id. (citation omitted). 
 119 746 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 2001). 
 120 Id. at 266 (citing Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 662 N.E.2d 397, 335 (Ill. 1996)). 
 121 757 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 537 U.S. 51 (2002). 
 122 Id. at 80 (citing Busch, 662 N.E.2d 397). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 808 N.E.2d 957 (Ill. 2004). 
 126 Id. at 970 (citations omitted). 
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American River Transportation Co.,127 the court unequivocally 
“reject[ed] plaintiff’s claim that we are bound by federal court decisions 
on this issue [of federal statutory interpretation].”128 It concluded that 
“federal circuit and district court decisions were recognized in Sprietsma 
as merely being persuasive.”129 
Some federal courts of appeals have addressed the force of federal 
court decisions on issues of federal law in state courts and, unlike most 
of the state court decisions discussed above, have done so in fairly 
substantial depth. In United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods,130 the 
Seventh Circuit analyzed the “sole reason” advanced by a habeas 
petitioner in support of the issuance of a writ—that the Supreme Court of 
Illinois’ affirmance of his conviction and rejection of his federal 
constitutional challenge to the state law under which he was convicted 
contradicted the decision of a federal district court finding the statute 
unconstitutional.131 The Seventh Circuit observed that state courts were 
divided on the question of whether they were bound by federal court 
decisions on issues of federal law, and sided with the view that those 
courts were not so bound. The court explained that both state courts of 
last resort and federal courts of appeal were, with respect to federal law 
questions, “coordinate courts” subject to the “supervisory jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court of the United States.”132 But “because lower federal 
courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state tribunals, decisions of 
lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts.”133 
In Yniguez v. Arizona,134 however, the Ninth Circuit expressed 
“serious doubts” that state courts could ignore the decisions of federal 
courts of appeal on federal questions.135 It reasoned that “[h]aving chosen 
to create the lower federal courts, Congress may have intended that just 
as state courts have the final word on questions of state law, the federal 
courts ought to have the final word on questions of federal law.”136 “The 
contrary view[,]” the Ninth Circuit noted, “could lead to considerable 
friction between the state and federal courts as well as duplicative 
litigation.”137 Moreover, the court concluded, “if decisions of the federal 
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courts of appeals invalidating state laws carry no authority, it would be 
difficult to comprehend why for so many years a right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court was provided in all cases in which federal circuit courts 
held state statutes unconstitutional.”138 
Despite the fact that most states have taken definitive positions on 
the precedential force of “inferior” federal courts’ federal law decisions, 
they have, by and large, failed to offer much in the way of substantive 
analysis in support of their adopted positions. There are certainly 
arguments supporting both views. For one, though the Supreme Court 
has thus far only construed the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution’s reference to “laws of the United States” to encompass its 
own federal law decisions139 (of course, the phrase also includes 
“Treaties” and federal statutes “made pursuant to the United States 
Constitution”), the Court has not rejected the extension of the Supremacy 
Clause to federal courts of appeals’ decisions. Indeed, one can easily 
interpret the plain text of the Supremacy Clause to include federal courts 
of appeals’ and district court opinions as well.140 
But how could or would a court delimit such a reading of the 
Supremacy Clause? Would just federal court of appeals’ opinions be 
controlling by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, or would federal district 
court opinions be as well? If only the former would be controlling, why? 
And which federal court of appeals’ decisions would be controlling? Just 
those from the circuit in which the particular state is located, i.e., would 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania only be bound by Third Circuit 
decisions? If so, why? If federal court of appeals’ decisions outside the 
geographical circuit in which a particular state is located can be deemed 
controlling, how might a state court select from such out-of-circuit 
decisions when they conflict? 
These questions highlight the problems with the view that federal 
courts of appeals’ decisions are controlling. But there are also problems 
with the majority view that federal courts of appeals’ are not controlling. 
First, how can one justify that federal courts must strongly defer to state 
intermediate appellate courts when ascertaining state law under Erie, 
while state courts are free to ignore intermediate federal appellate courts 
                                                                                                             
 138 Id. at 737. As indicated above, on appeal, the Supreme Court reacted skeptically to 
the Ninth Circuit’s views in Yniguez, referring to the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion that state 
courts were bound by federal court decisions on issues of federal law as “remarkable.”  
See Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 58 n.11 (1997). 
 139 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
 140 See, e.g., State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 861 (Ohio 2001) (noting that the 
“language of the Supremacy Clause is sufficiently broad (‘the Laws of the United States’) 
to encompass all federal court decisions.”). 
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when ascertaining federal law? The lack of parallelism at least gives 
some pause. More pragmatically, leaving state courts unconstrained in 
their adjudication of federal law questions only increases the likelihood 
and scope of discord among state and federal courts. We have come to 
accept disagreement between and among federal district courts and 
courts of appeals on issues of federal law. But disagreement on federal 
issues between and among federal courts and the courts of the fifty states 
presents an entirely different level of disunity. Moreover, federal court 
disagreement is, at least theoretically, generally not intra-circuit—as 
discussed above, it is elementary that district courts are bound by their 
federal circuit’s federal law pronouncements, and a panel of a federal 
court of appeals is bound by a prior panel’s federal law 
pronouncements.141 But disagreement between states and federal court of 
appeals can create two different standards under the same legal principle 
within the same state, the applicability of which depends solely on the 
court – state or federal – in which one finds him or herself. 
All of this tends to support the view set forth by Professor 
Zeigler—“that state courts adopt a single standard that is analogous to 
the rule the federal courts follow for ascertaining state law. State courts 
should decide federal questions the way they believe the Supreme Court 
would decide them.”142 Although this approach will not eliminate 
uncertainty and unpredictability, it would provide a uniform rule for all 
state courts and limit the frequency of state-federal disagreements on 
issues of federal law in the absence of a Supreme Court pronouncement. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The federal courts of appeals decide thousands of cases each year 
addressing questions of both state and federal law. Depending on the 
                                                                                                             
 141 Of course, our system does tolerate intra-circuit disagreement among federal 
district courts when, for example, their superior federal court of appeals has not spoken 
on an issue of federal law in a controlling fashion. Under these circumstances, federal 
district courts within the circuit are free to disagree with each other. Moreover, because 
federal district courts generally do not consider themselves bound by their own 
precedent, see In re Executive Office of the President, 215 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(per curiam) (“District Court decisions do not establish the law of the circuit, nor, indeed, 
do they even establish ‘the law of the district.’”) (citing, inter alia, Threadgill v. 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991)) (other citation 
omitted); G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Global Shop Solutions, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 826, 830 n.4 
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court.”) (citations omitted).  There may also be disagreement within a particular federal 
district where the relevant federal court of appeals has not yet ruled on a particular 
federal question. 
 142 See Zeigler, supra note 73, at 1177. 
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state or federal jurisdiction, these decisions can be powerful weapons for 
litigants asserting or defending state and federal law claims. 
Accordingly, knowing how federal court of appeals’ decisions might be 
received in a particular state or federal court is essential to practitioners, 
and could be the difference between winning and losing. By highlighting 
state and federal courts’ contrasting approaches to applying federal court 
of appeals’ precedent, this Article should only reinforce the potential 
importance of federal court of appeals’ precedent and how it might apply 
to help (or hurt) one’s case. 
